Harding University

Scholar Works at Harding
The Entrepreneur

The Belden Center for Private Enterprise
Education

Summer 6-1-1986

The Entrepreneur (vol. 10, no. 4)
Don P. Diffine Ph.D.
Harding University, ddiffine@harding.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.harding.edu/belden-entrepreneur

Recommended Citation
Diffine, D. P. (1986). The Entrepreneur (vol. 10, no. 4). Retrieved from https://scholarworks.harding.edu/
belden-entrepreneur/42

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the The Belden Center for Private Enterprise Education at
Scholar Works at Harding. It has been accepted for
inclusion in The Entrepreneur by an authorized
administrator of Scholar Works at Harding. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@harding.edu.

Summer 1986

Vol. 10, No. 4

The Belden Center for Private Enterprise Education
Harding University School of Business
Searcy, Arkansas

This issue courtesy of Mr. Steve Phillips, Phillips Lumber Co., Inc., Cedar Hill, Texas

Free To J--'ose:
The Bright Side Of Economic Failure
by

Harding University Team
Wins National Honors
The Harding University Economics Team, competing
at the International Exposition of Students in Free
Enterprise (SIFE), hosted by Holiday Inns, Inc. May
19-21, 1986 in Memphis, Tennessee, was awarded a
check for $3,500 and a National Runner-up trophy for
their achievements.
The 1986 team is composed of Stephanie Carter, cocaptain from Bentonville; Kevin Thompson, co-captain
from San Diego, California; Melissa Brenneman from
Spartanburg, South Carolina; Bruce Picker from
Searcy, Arkansas; Joel Reed from New Haven, Indiana;
and their sponsor, Dr. Don Diffine, professor of
economics and director of the Belden Center for Private
Enterprise Education.
The Harding program entry was "Capitalism is Innovative - It Made America." The Economics Team
presentation described 68 projects and programs with
14 on-campus and 44 civic, professional and educational
groups in the mid-south.
Harding Economics Team Projects receiving special
mention were these: "Capital Day" launched to salute
entrepreneurs; an "Important Economic Trivia" prototype game; the "FREE MARKET CALENDAR A Daily Chronicle of Enterprise;" "All American
Economics - Made in the U.S.A., a salute to WalMart's 'Buy American' Program;" Project "Hometown
America;" Project "Chain Reaction;" "P.R.O.F.I.T."
Theme Contest with Wal-Mart Associates; "Empresa"
Program for Spanish-Speaking students; "Images in
Free Enterprise" Contest in Visual Arts; and "What
Does Johnny's Dad Do?" project.
The national SIPE competition brought Tl regional
winners together for two days of intensive competition.
Fifty judges from business and industry across the
United States evaluated each collegiate finalist.

Richard B. McKenzie, Visiting Professor
Center for the Study of American Business
Washington University
St. Louis, Missouri
Success is the professed goal of every economy, and the
U.S. economy has had its successes. Those successes are
vividly portrayed in statistical terms through the historical
records of growth in gross national product, and in more
human terms through the emancipation of many Americans
from the grip of poverty and in the elevation of many others
to riches.
But failures are also endemic to the U.S. economy. A continual flow of news reports on bankruptcies, plant closings,
layoffs, stock market slumps, industrial accidents, financial
losses and persistent poverty makes the fact of pervasive
failures indubitably clear.
While there is no reliable data on the total number of annual business failures in the United States, Dunn and
Bradstreet reported more than 31,000 commercial and industrial businesses failed in the United States (one every 17
minutes) last year. And the number of business failures during that year and the previous two or three years was up
dramatically from the level of the 1970s. Thousands of farms
also went under last year, while tens of thousands more
teetered on the brink of bankruptcy.
The prevalence and consequences of economic failure are
also reflected by the number of unemployed and dislocated
workers. A rising trend in the number and percentage of
unemployed American workers has emerged over the past two
decades. Although the unemployment rate was falling in the
mid-1980s, there were still more than 8 million Americans
looking for jobs in the beginning of 1986.
Between 1979 and January 1984, 11.5 million Americans
experienced a period of unemployment because of "a plant
closing, an employer ·going out of business, [or] a layoff
from which ... (the worker in question) was not recalled." Over
5 million of these workers had significant tenure (more than
three years) at their jobs, causing them to be officially
characterized as "dislocated." And a quarter of these

dislocated workers were still looking for work in January
1984.
Unfortunately, it is all too easy to dwell on the dark side
of economic forces - on the pain that people feel when affected by business failures . Such pain is brought to life on
the television screen when fired or laid-off workers,
foreclosed farmers and the homeless are interviewed for nightly news programs. The emotional appeal for governmental
remedies is indeed intense and compelling, so much so that
policymakers can hardly overlook them. Confronted with the
consequences of failures, they are frequently driven to "do
something."

"While failures may often be undeserved, unjust
and unfair, the system
that spawns them may still be just and fair.
The purpose of this paper is to add balance to public discussions of failure"s by emphasizing a frequently overlooked
point: While failures may often be undeserved, unjust and
unfair, the system that spawns them may still be just and fair.
Democracies have a built-in political bias toward mitigating
short-run failures and, in the process, creating long-run
mischief. I make these points by first observing that many
failures not only have a rational foundation but are often, but
not always, expected by economic agents - private citizens
(consumers and investors) and government policymakers.
So while failures are avoided where possible, many failures
remain unavoidable but still instructive. Indeed, failures often
inspire future successes. Moreover, they are often a necessary
side effect of success. That is the bright side of economic
failure.

The Economy of Failure
The Failures of Scarcity
Economists have long noted that because people's wants
far outstrip their abilities to produce, choices involving the
allocation of resources are unavoidable. That point, while
patently obvious, is fundamental because it acknowledges that
not all goods and services can be produced. Nor is it
reasonable to expect that all goods currently produced will
continue to be produced. Some producers will fail to secure
the necessary resources to start production. Others, already
in production, will fail to retain the resources they have.
In other words, choice and the necessity of allocation make
failure certain and unavoidable. However, it cannot be forgotten that while some firms fail, others succeed.
The prevalence of scarcity ensures the pervasiveness of
failure. This is because of the pervasiveness of success that is, the ability of some to secure resources, at the same
time, denies resources to others. Firms go bankrupt, factories
close and workers are unemployed because strategic resources
are reallocated to other more successful firms, factories and
workers.

Indeed, the failures of some increase the probability of success for others. The failures release resources that can then
be employed (at possibly lower resource prices) by the remaining competitors. The reduced supply of goods and services can then be sold at higher prices and, thus, on more
profitable terms.
The growth in the number of business failures during the
early 1980s is partially a product of the twin recessions,
spawned in large measure by government policies to reduce
inflation . However, many failures were also spurred by the
emergence of new firms and the expansion of established
ones. There has been substantial growth in new incorporations, although the number of new incorporations is only
a rough measure of the emergence of new businesses. There
were 600,000 businesses incorporated in 1983, more than
twice the number of 1970.
The businesses that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s caused
the demise of others by driving up the price of resources to
the point where some firms were no longer competitive.

Relative Performance and Failures
The economic source of failure is, in a world of scarcity,
a matter of relative performance levels. The firms that fold
may be well organized; the plants that close may be efficient;
and the workers unemployed may be productive.
The fundamental goal of every economy is presumably to
produce the highest consumer satisfaction with the resources
available. The process of failure is driven by peoples' efforts
to get the most possible from these limited resources.
Policymakers often lament the impact of imports on
domestic production and relate imports to plant closures and
unemployment. Textile and apparel trade restrictions, for example, have been proposed on the proposition that expanding imports caused the closure of as many as 250 textile
and apparel plants between 1980 and 1985, robbing American
textile and apparel workers in the United States of hundreds
of thousands of jobs. From my research in this area , it appears that other American producers are, in effect, the competitive culprit, at least in the textile industry. The firms in
and out of the textile industry that were relatively more cost
effective in production have expanded sales - the least efficient firms and plants went out of business.
While textile, apparel, and several other U.S. industries
blame foreigners for many of their troubles, the industries
have substantially "failed" in their competition with other
domestic producers for control over available and limited
resources. Other American producers have been, in effect,
the competitive culprits because they are the ones that were
relatively more successful in capturing the country's comparative advantage in production and in being able to export
(and not face import competition) .

Information and Failures
The process of failure is greatly aggravated by the scarcity
of one critically important resource - information.

Knowledge on customer wants and competitors' plans is imprecise and costly to obtain.
The information problem is made more complex - and
more subject to the constraints of scarcity - by the amount
and kind of information that can help achieve success and
avoid failure. Regrettably, such information is not readily accessible. Information on the availability of resources is widely
scattered among thousands, if not millions, of people and must
somehow be induced from its holders. It is influenced by the
amount of resources applied to gathering information, i.e.,
the amount and quality of information obtained will depend
greatly on its cost.

Public policy "solutions" to failure may
accomplish nothing more than
reallocating resources - redistributing successes
and failures.
To say the absence of adequate information is a source of
failures is to state the obvious, but such obvious points are
often overlooked when policymakers consider remedies for
failures, especially remedies that fail to address the information problem. Moreover, there may be no solution to the information problem because key bits of competitive knowledge
may not be available at any price. Public policy "solutions"
to failure may accomplish nothing more than reallocating
resources - redistributing successes and failures. Indeed,
changing people's incentives to provide and acquire information may aggravate the problem of failure.
Much has been made of information problems inherent in
a market economy. Since the multitude of market participants
has only limited information, i.e., their own individual plans
that are not coordinated with the plans of all others in the
market, economic resources may be wasted. In a market
economy, the left hand often does not know what the right
hand is doing. Housing, for example, goes through boom and
bust cycles because individual contractors, who are uncertain of each other's plans, overbuild, causing precipitous price
drops, bankruptcies and contractor failures.
Many critics presume that centralizing the decision-making
process would solve the information problem. Central planning of production may solve some information problems for example, how much is supplied - but it would not answer
how much production consumers want. Furthermore, central decision-making runs a~ok when attempting to allocate
resources among available producers.
One of the great virtues of markets is that they divide
responsibility for obtaining and handling information among
a host of market participants, especially information that can
minimize the chance of failures. Centrally directed economic
activity can impose superhuman demands on the limited
capacity of planners to handle information. Increases in the
complexity of production processes that may emerge with the
integration of the world economy and with technological
development only increase demands that would be imposed
on planners.

Risk, Uncertainty, and Rational Failures
Information deficiencies ultimately translate into problems
of risk and uncertainty about future economic events. Risk,
which is grounded in probability, means that some ventures
will not go as planned. That is to say, risk is a statement about
the distribution of successes and failures over a series of ventures. For example, 7 out of 10 restaurants will fail. The missing information is which ventures will succeed and which
will fail, and the information is often missing because of its
cost.
Uncertainty, on the other hand, amounts to a lack of information about the distribution of outcomes - numbers of
successes and failures. Uncertainty emerges because of lack
of experience and difficulty in obtaining the requisite information on the probability of successes or failures. The cost
of information no doubt plays a role in establishing the degree
of uncertainty.
Risk and uncertainty ensure failures. Not everything can
turn out right. Attempting to eliminate failure in the face of
risk and uncertainty could be counterproductive because the
costs of doing so probably would be higher than the costs
endured through failures. In other words, in spite of the
undesirable results of failure - closed plants, unemployed
workers and erosion of a local economic base - the costs
of protecting against failure - slower economic growth, a
retarded pace of innovation, and lack of international competitiveness - may be far greater in the long run.
In its raw form, risk and uncertainty imply that many
failures are no less founded in rational planning than are production and consumption decisions that do not always match
expectations. Less than perfectly suitable goods and services
are produced because the benefits of improving them would
not be worth the cost. Plants close because the cost of preventing their closure through the acquisition of more market information is greater than the costs associated with a shutdown.
In each instance of failure, an economic cost exists, of
course; and as with any other cost, the cost of failure would
preferably be reduced, if not totally avoided. However, most
failures are not isolated ventures but are part and parcel of
a whole complex of ventures, all of which combined have
some risk and uncertainty of not working out as planned.
Risky and uncertain ventures typically carry the greatest
rewards, partially to overcome the costs associated with failure
and partially to compensate for people's natural or learned
inclination to avoid risky and uncertain outcomes. (In the
jargon of economists, many people are "risk averse.") If an
outcome is more risky and uncertain, the reward tends to be
greater.
We can draw an analogy with the stock market investor
who understands that the purchase of stocks entails risk and
uncertainty along with the prospect of rewards. An investor
typically assembles several different stocks in a portfolio,
understanding that one or more of his purchases occasionally, perhaps even frequently, will not appreciate in value as
he or she expected. The investor evaluates the selections by

how the entire portfolio does on balance. In this sense, failure
is planned, expected and even sought.

Firm managers and workers typically
deal with risk and uncertainty through
what amounts to "portfolios" of activities.
To ensure that no stock ever fails is a prescription for a
less desirable return on the portfolio of stocks. However,
because expected income is increased through the development of a portfolio of stocks, the investor is better able to
buy more stock - in turn suffering additional failures but
also realizing greater successes.
Firm managers and workers typically deal with risk and
uncertainty through what amounts to "portfolios" of activities.
Managers develop a variety of products and run several plants
knowing that some plants will have to be closed. In effect,
they develop portfolios of products and plants and plan for
failures, although they simultaneously will do what they can
(or what is economically reasonable) to avoid these failures.
By developing portfolios, managers expect to increase their
production incomes on balance. Their ability to spread risks
and increase their firm's income means more products will
be developed and more plants opened. But it also means a
greater number of failures, although the failure rate may be
reduced through greater experience with more products and
plants and through a greater capacity to absorb the costs of
avoiding failure.
Workers and consumers also engage in "portfolio management." Workers often develop a variety of skills (or keep their
skills general, applicable to many different work environments) and engage in a variety of activities, one of which
is a job. They understand that through time and over the
course of many activities and jobs, they will at times fail become unemployed or find their skills and abilities of less
value than planned.
Many consumers also buy appliances that they know are
not "top of the line" and will occasionally fail. They buy
what they do in anticipation that their portfolios will yield
them a greater net return than if they bought more expensive
appliances with a lower chance of failure. The important point
is that in spite of the failures, consumers and workers manage
their portfolios with the intent of raising their incomes.

Learning from Failures
It is all too ea'sy to think solely of failure as tragedy. After
all, we do expend considerable energy seeking to avoid individual failures.
Yet failures can be highly instructive and productive. They
help, perhaps more than successes, to outline the bounds of
profitable and productive economic acitivity. Failures instruct
those who fail on what they should not do the next time, if
there is a next time. More importantly, they tell others in the
market what was done wrong and what will have to be done
to become and/or remain successful. Economic failures are,

thus, a critically important source of information. As such,
they provide market participants with the necessary incentives and disincentives (instructions) on what people, acting
independently of one another, should and should not do.
International competition and domestic deregulation may
be sources of greater risk of failure for U.S. firms, but what
American managers have learned in the process is that they
must rethink management practices and investment strategies.
As a result, the performance of the U.S. economy will likely
show feedback effects in improved growth during the 1990s,
if not sooner.

The market system is a portfolio writ
large: Over the course of many individual
decisions and economic circumstances,
the welfare of the vast majority of people
will be enhanced through individual
successes and failures.
The market system is itself a portfolio writ large. One
justification for free markets is that over time - and over
the course of many individual decisions and economic circumstances - the welfare of the vast majority of people will,
on balance, be enhanced through combinations of individual
successes and failures. The pricing system is a critically important force in minimizing failures because it provides people with necessary market information, coordinating individual activities by the well-known "invisible hand."

The Justice of Failure
Clearly, not all failures are just or fair. Some failures are
the consequence of violations of contracts. Banks have failed because employees have embezzled funds. Real estate deals
have failed because contractors did not build buildings as they
said they would. And manufacturing plants have closed
because supplies have not been delivered as promised or
strategic employees did not fulfill their contracts. The injustice
of these instances of failures are interesting because they
represent behavior that violates the prevailing roles of
economic behavior.
However, many failures may be just in the sense that no
previously agreed-upon rules have been violated. All contracts may have been honored; all rules obeyed. The firms
simply failed as a consequence of problems associated with
scarcity, namely risk and uncertainty. Indeed, the failures may
have been anticipated, and no loss of income may have
resulted.
Individual instances of failures, isolated from successes,
may all appear to be unjust or unfair, but this does not mean
that the system that led to the failures is unjust or unfair.
Again, no previously agreed-upon rules may have been
violated. In addition, failures may mirror an increase in income for those who experience the failures. People may be
hurt by their own failures, but they can be helped by their
other successes and by the failures and successes of others
that result in improved goods and services they buy. The result

can be a greater income from a system that allows failures
than one that deliberately attempts to contain them. The prospects of greater income, in spite of the prospects of failures,
can be the impetus for the consent of those within the system.
Still, not everyone is likely to gain from a market system
that permits unchecked failures. There will be those who fail
at everything or practically everything and end up as net losers
from the system. The question of whether net losers should
be helped by public means is a difficult question, one that
cannot be fully treated here. Participants may agree to a
system that allows for some compensation to be paid to the
losers, thus maintaining the necessary public support for the
market system. Under those circumstances, it is particularly
hard to see how the system could be viewed as unjust.

The Samaritan's Dilemma
Those who seem to object to public efforts to help
businesses that go bankrupt, farmers whose farms are sold
at auction and workers who experience involuntary unemployment are often viewed as unfeeling - unable to empathize
with the economic difficulties, encountered by others.
However, differences on what should be done to remedy
failures arise even among those who care. This is because
of the ever-present Samaritan's dilemma: Should those in need
be helped by public means if it means future reliance on outside help? The answer is not so obvious as might be presumed.
If public aid had no consequence beyond mitigating the
adverse effects of failure, the debate would not be nearly so
intense as it often is. However, as with failure, relief also has
consequences. It can encourage the very problem that is the
object of the public remedy. Relief can make failures more

palatable and, thereby, more likely. It can reduce the tendency of a market economy to economize on failures and to learn
from them. Hence, it does not follow that those who object
to public remedies necessarily object to helping others. Objectors can be concerned about those future groups who will
suffer from failures that are encouraged by policies adopted
today.

The more dynamic, venturesome and
growth-oriented a market economy is, the
more it will be fraught with failures.
High levels of business bankruptcy
are not the product of capitalism's failure
but of its success.
The more dynamic, venturesome and growth-oriented a
market economy is, the more it will be fraught with failures.
High levels of business bankruptcy are not the product of
capitalism's failure but of its success. People undertake new
enterprises because of the possibility of success. A policy of
rewarding failure would inevitably require restricting new truly viable enterprises.
As the late Joseph Schumpeter has reminded us, the
paradox of capitalism is that it is most successful when most
dynamic, and when most dynamic, it is most destructive. The
large numbers of economic failures in the United States are
an inevitable companion to the substantial expansion of sales,
employment and profits in recent years. Perhaps the most convincing evidence, then, of the bright side of economic failure
is the invidious comparison of U.S. economic success to the
economic performance of the more security-conscious nations of Western Europe.

Richard McKenzie is John M. Olin Visiting Professor at the Center for the Study of American Business, Washington
University in St. Louis. He is on leave from Clemson University. This is a reprint of a CSAB Publication.

